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Promotion of "Green" Electricity and
International Dispute Settlement: Trade and
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Abstract
The issue of greater utilization of renewables in energy supply-mix has
become a priority environmental agenda in many countries. Feed-in
incentives, quota schemes, public tenders and net metering are common
support programmes that are designed to encourage the production and
consumption of electricity generated from renewable energy sources.
Promotion policies of this kind have provoked a number of international
disputes at both global and regional levels. This article examines disputes
brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Court of Justice of
the European Union ("Court of Justice") and investor-state tribunals, and
explores some intersectional implications and comparisons for the
government measures in question. While implementation of "green"
electricity support schemes in compliance with the respective legal regimes
will definitely minimize international frictions, intensification of crossborder exchanges of renewable electricity represents an additional tool that
could be used for that purpose.
I.

Introduction

In order to cope with climate change problems and exhaustibility of fossil
fuels, most nations have taken necessary action to increase the use of
renewable energy for the sake of their present and future economic
development. Recent statistics suggest that at least 144 countries have
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LLB with Honours (University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Uzbekistan). This research
was supported by the grant of the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by the
Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A3A2054969). Many thanks go to Professors Chang-fa Lo,
Shin-yi Peng, Rolf H. Weber, Dukgeun Ahn, Bryan Mercurio, Rostam J. Neuwirth, Junji
Nakagawa and other participants of the Joint Asian International Economic Law Conference
(Bali, Indonesia, 20-21 July 2015) for their valuable questions, comments and opinions on the
earlier draft and the subject of this article.
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renewable energy targets, and 138 countries including many developing and
emerging economies have renewable energy support policies in place.'
Renewables are widely considered as environmentally friendly substitutes
for conventional energy-rich fuels and a significant contributor to securing
sustainable power output. Governments play an important role in making
them more attractive in the market by encouraging both supply and demand
sides. The International Energy Agency estimated that renewables received
101 billion dollars in subsidies in 2012, with the largest portion of this
amount being spent on electricity generation.2 Among generating
technologies, solar photovoltaic was the top recipient, followed by wind and
bioenergy.3
Whereas the policy of "greening" energy supply is justified in today's
realities, the manner countries devise it to aid actors in this sector may cause
tensions at both domestic and international levels. This article examines
international trade and investment disputes over public support for
renewables-based electricity initiated under judicial procedures of the
WTO, the European Union (EU), and investment treaties. It shows that

the litigation practice in such different frameworks offers interesting
intersectional comparisons and implications for the government measures in
question.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II discusses
some specific attributes of electricity as a unique good and explains most
common green schemes. Sections III, IV and V provide legal assessments
for all relevant cases of the WVTO, the EU, and investment agreements,
respectively. Section VI examines the linkage between trade and investment
regimes as related to the topic.
II.

Electricity and Green Support Schemes

Electrical energy - electricity - is considered in trade lexicon as a good,4
and classified by the World Customs Organization under Harmonized
System Code number 271600.5 Only thirty-one countries have import
1. RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RENEWABLEs 2014

GLOBAL STATUs REPORT 14 (2014), http://www.ren21.net/Portals/O/documents/Resources/

GSR/2014/GSR2014_full%20report_1ow%20res.pdf [hereinafter REN21].
2. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, at 226 (OECD &
2013), http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2013.pdf.

IEA eds.,

3. Id.
4. See Panel Reports, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector / Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-In TariffProgram,para. 7.11, n. 46, WT/DS412/
R, WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012) (adopted May 24, 2013), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/
FESearch/FESSO06.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%2Owt/ds426/r*%2Onot%2Orw*)&Language=
ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUlChanged=true#

[hereinafter

Panel

Reports]; see also Case C-158/94, Comm'n v. Italy, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5789, para. 17.
5. HEYMI BAHAR & JEHAN SAUVAGE, Cross-BorderTrade in Electricity and the Development of
Renewables-Based Electric Power, in OECD TRADE & ENVIRONMENT WORKING PAPERs 2013/
02, at 27 (OECD ed., 2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/
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duties for electricity, and the tariff level is generally less than fifteen
percent.6 Compared to other goods, electricity possesses a number of
peculiar characteristics. It is intangible, not easily storable, and must be
produced and consumed simultaneously. The electricity supply chain
includes consecutive stages, such as generation by power plants, transmission
by operators, distribution via high-voltage and low-voltage transmission
lines (collectively a "grid"), and consumption by end-users. Electricity
networks can function properly as long as a balance between generation and
consumption is maintained. Failing that, the system will experience voltage
dips (brownouts) or blackouts causing damage to transmission
infrastructures. This balance is preserved by a management system that
coordinates all stages in the electricity supply chain and by a mix of baseload, intermediate and peaking generation facilities. Base-load generation
occurs in e.g. nuclear and hydroelectric stations that are operated
continuously virtually all the time to meet the base level of an expected
demand in a given territory. As the power output cannot be easily adjusted,
base-load generation is supplemented with more flexible intermediate and
peak-load resources. Intermediate generating facilities - e.g. coal or naturalgas-fired plants - operate normally during the day and evening time when
the demand for electricity is above its base level but still below its peak.
Peak-load resources - e.g. oil or simple-cycle gas burning facilities - are
used only when the demand is extremely high, for instance, in the hottest
days of summer.7
As of the end of 2013, renewable electricity accounted for 22.1 percent of
the global electricity production and comprised hydropower (16.4 percent),
wind power (2.9 percent), bio-power (1.8 percent), solar photovoltaic (0.7
percent), geothermal energy and others (0.4 percent).s Whereas
hydropower (in general), bio-mass and geothermal energy lead to relatively
stable electricity output, "variable" renewables - solar energy, wind power
and run-of-river hydropower without reservoir storage - allow only
intermittent generation which depends on meteorological conditions.9
Renewable electricity is often combined with conventional electricity to
minimize any disruption in the power supply system and constitutes an
integral part of the whole energy supply-mix.
In order to increase the share of renewable electricity, governments have
established various support programmes that include, most typically, feed-in
tariff (FIT) and premiums, quota obligations, public tenders or auctions, and
net metering. Under the FIT system, generators sell renewable electricity at
a fixed price on a contractual long-term basis. The price is set at the level
5k4869cdwnzr.pdf expires=1466424168&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=0515017EEBDA
95B266F8D8DA76E0E333.
6. Id.
7. The description of electricity and the electricity system is based on id., at 46; Panel
Reports, supra note 4, paras. 7.10-20.
8. REN21, supra note 1, at 25.
9. BAH4AR & SAUVAGE, supra note 5, at 11; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 2, at 208.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
346

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 49, NO. 3

higher than the comparable market value to cover both production costs and
profit. Unlike FITs, feed-in premiums are paid on top of the electricity
market price and fluctuate over time. FITs and premiums lower investment
and capital risks while guaranteeing access to the grid. As of early 2014,
sixty-eight countries had feed-in policies in place.io
As quantity-driven instruments, quota schemes, which are used in twentynine countries, oblige utilities, electricity suppliers, consumers or other
actors in the market to purchase a pre-determined minimum share of
renewable electricity or else pay a fine for non-compliance." The quota
obligations are usually accompanied with specific certificates (or credits) that
serve as proof of the renewable electricity utilization.12 The actors can sell
or buy the certificates when they exceed or fall short of their quota. 3
Public tenders or auctions assure winning generators of stable purchases
of renewable electricity within a defined period at a price fixed through the
bidding process. This system provides a mechanism of price discovery in the
respective market preventing potential windfall profits or underpayments
while maintaining long-term guarantees for generators.' 4 This makes it a
popular support instrument in fifty-five countries.15
Finally, net metering allows households or small businesses that have
generating facilities - normally, solar photovoltaic installations or smallscale wind turbines - to send back the excess (non-used) green power
produced from those facilities into the grid in exchange for certain favours.
In particular, the electricity meter of such customer-generators will run
backwards to provide a credit that they can use against the electricity taken
from the grid at other times. The customer-generators can also roll over
excess electricity produced during one billing period to the next one.1 6 This
scheme works in forty-three countries.17
All the support programmes above are described in general terms only. As
we will see in the next sections, they may have specific features in different
10. See REN21, supra note 1, at 89-91.
11. See id.
12. HEYMI BAHAR, JAGODA EGELAND & RONALD STEENBLIK, Domestic Incentive Measures for
Renewable Energy with Possible Trade Implications, in OECD TRADE & ENVIRONMENT WORKING
PAPERS 2013/01, at 27 (OECD ed., 2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/

Sk44srlksr6f.pdfPexpires=1466439265&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=6E2B2EE91 F6DCD
2D724EE7722FD430C6.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., INT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY AUCTIONS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at 6, 44 (IRENA ed., 2013), https://www.irena.org/DocumentDown

loads/Publications/IRENARenewableenergyuauctions-indeveloping-countries.pdf

see also
18 (Mara
https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2014/

FAUNHOFER ET AL., AUCTIONS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Marthe

Kleiner ed., 2014),

Ausschreibungen-fuer-Erneuerbare-Energien-EU/AgoraAuctions-Paper_-056_web.pdf
on behalf of Agora Energiewende).

15. See REN21, supra note 1, at 89-91.
16. BAHAR ET AL., supra note 12, at 29.
17. See REN21, supra note 1, at 89-91.
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nations. Some of those programmes may require the use of certain
generating equipment or inputs of domestic origin, or introduce
mechanisms for offsetting costs associated with renewables, with the form
and degree of government's engagement varying from country to country
and scheme to scheme.
III.

WTO Dispute Settlement Cases

As of December 1, 2015, six disputes challenging renewable energy
subsidies were brought to the WTO under the Subsidies and Countervailing
-

Measures (SCM) Agreement.s Only two of them - Canada - Certain
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector and Canada
Measures Relating to the Feed-in TariffProgram - have so far resulted in panel

and appellate rulings adopted. The remaining four cases were brought in
relation to biodiesel (Argentina v. European Union), solar cells and modules
(United States v. India), the renewable energy generation sector (China v.
the European Union and certain member states), and wind power equipment
(United States v. China). The complainants in all six cases took issue about
the respondent's allegedly unlawful subsidies granted for renewable energy
and/or related equipment. The analysis in this section will focus only on the
findings in the two aforementioned cases jointly litigated against Canada
-

(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Canada - Renewable Energy / Canada
Feed-In Tariff Program").
In Canada - Renewable Energy / Canada - Feed-In TariffProgram, at issue

was a FIT programme established by the government of Canadian province

-

18. See Request for Consultations by Argentina, European Union - Certain Measures on the
Importation and Marketing ofBiodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, WT/DS459/
1 (May 15, 2013), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=
(@Symbol=%20wt/ds459/1%20or%20wt/ds459/1/*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=Fomer
ScriptedSearch&languageUlChanged=true#; see also Request for Consultations by the United
States, India - Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/1 (Feb. 6,
2013), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FES_S006.aspx?Query=(@Sym
bol=%20wt/ds456/1%20or%20wt/ds456/1/*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScrip
tedSearch&languageULIChanged=true#; see also Request for Consultations by China, European
Union and Certain Member States - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector, WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 5, 2012) https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FES_S
006.aspx? Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds452/1 %20or%20wt/ds452/1/*)&Language=ENGLISH
&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageULIChanged=true#; see also Request for Consultations by the European Union, Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-in TariffProgram, WT/
DS426/1 (Aug. 11, 2011), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FES_S006.aspx?
Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds426/1)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&
languageUlChanged=true#; see also Request for Consultations by the United States, China
Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Dec. 22, 2010), https://
docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FESS006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds419/1)&
LanguageENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUChanged=true#;
see also
Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector, WT.DS412/1 (Sep. 13, 2010), available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/
FESearch/FESS006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds412/1)&Language=ENGLISH&Co
ntext=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUlChanged=true#.
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Ontario in 2009. Under that programme, generators of solar or windpower-based electricity are paid a guaranteed price per kWh of electricity
delivered into the Ontario electricity system under twenty-year or forty-year
contracts if they meet the "Minimum Required Domestic Content Level"
for installation of related equipment.19
In September 2010 and August 2011, Japan and the European Union,
respectively, initiated WATO dispute settlement proceedings claiming that
the FIT scheme violates the national treatment provisions of Article 111:4 of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) and Article 2.1
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs
Agreement), as well as subsidy disciplines of Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the
SCM Agreement. The first two provisions forbid WTO members to
discriminate against imported goods to the favour of competing domestic
counterparts. Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement disallow
subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods, i.e.
import-substitution (or local-content) subsidies.
A.

NATIONAL TREATMENT AND GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT

Canada argued that the FIT programme regulating government
procurement of renewable electricity was not subject to the national
treatment provisions because of Article 111:8(a) of the GATT,20 which reads:
The provisions of [Article III of the GATT] shall not apply to laws,
regulations or requirements governing the procurement by
governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental
purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use
in the production of goods for commercial sale.21
At the outset, the Appellate Body characterized Article 111:8(a) as
derogation from national treatment under both Article III of the GATT and
the TRIMs Agreement.22 The Appellate Body dismissed some panel
findings and advanced its own interpretations instead. It said that the word
"procurement" refers to the process of a governmental agency of obtaining
products whereas the word "purchased" describes a way of how procurement
can materialize.23 Furthermore, the Appellate Body observed that public
purchases must simultaneously meet both conditions of being "for
governmental purposes" and "not with a view to commercial resale. . . in
19. Panel Reports, supra note 4, paras. 7.64-68.
20. Panel Reports, supra note 4, paras. 7.86-.87.
21. Panel Reports, supra note 4, para. 7.116.
22. Appellate Body Reports, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector / Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, paras. 5.33, 5.56,
WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013) (adopted May 24, 2013), https://
docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FESS006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds412/ab/
r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&ContextFomerScriptedSearch&languageUChang
ed=true# [hereinafter Appellate Body Reports].
23. Id. para. 5.59.
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order to be covered by Article III:8(a).24 The expression "products
purchased for governmental purposes" was construed to mean products
"purchased for the use of government, consumed by government, or
provided by government to recipients in the discharge of its public
functions."25 Government purchases for "commercial resale," which are to
be excluded from the scope of Article 111:8(a), are arm's length transactions,
and it is the nature of the relationship between a seller and buyer that,
according to the Appellate Body, determines whether a transaction is made
at arm's length.26
Instead of applying each of these interpretative findings to the case at
hand, the Appellate Body limited its analysis to the discussion of the product
scope holding that, for the purposes of the Article 111:8(a) derogation, the
imported product being discriminated against must be in a "competitive
relationship" with the domestic product purchased.27 Because electricity
(the product purchased) and electricity generation equipment (the product
subject to discrimination) are not like products, it concluded that the FIT
local-content requirement cannot be qualified as "laws, regulations or
requirements" that are exempted by Article III:8(a).28 Therefore, the FIT
programme discriminating against foreign equipment was found to violate
the national treatment provisions at issue.29
B.

SUBSIDY

A "subsidy" regulated by VVTO law consists of both a financial
contribution (or alternatively income or price support), and a resulting
benefit. Under the SCM Agreement, a "financial contribution" takes
different forms, such as transfers of public funds, non-collection of otherwise
due state revenues, and provision or purchase of goods.30 The "benefit"
exists where the financial contribution (or income/price support) makes its
recipient better off compared to other entities in the same market.31 The
benefit is determined through comparison of the terms of receipt of the
financial contribution with relevant market conditions.32
In the present case, the FIT programme requiring electricity purchases by
the Ontario Power Authority, a public agency responsible for management
of electricity supply and resources in the province, was characterized as the
government purchase of goods, but the Appellate Body admitted that it
could additionally fall under other forms of financial contribution or qualify
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
157,
32.

Id. para. 5.69.
Id. paras. 5.68, 5.74.
Id. para. 5.71.
Id. para. 5.79.
Id.
Id. para. 6.1(a); Panel Reports, supra note 4, paras. 8.2, 8.6.
See Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iv) of the SCM Agreement.
Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, para.
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) (adopted Aug. 20, 1999).
Id.
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as income or price support.33 The benefit determination focused on whether
FIT prices paid to generators were more advantageous than non-FIT
electricity prices in the marketplace. The panel failed to find a FIT-related
benefit because of the absence of a competitive electricity market in Ontario
and the unsuitability of proposed price benchmarks outside Ontario.34 The
panel's analysis was based on the premise that the relevant market for the
subsidy determination was a single market for electricity generated from all
sources of energy, rather than a separate green electricity market as argued
by Canada. The panel explained this with the fact that consumers in
Ontario do not distinguish between renewable and conventional electricity.35
But one of the panellists dissented and said that the mere existence of the
FIT programme suggests that the benefit was conferred, as high-cost green
projects would have failed without government's support. 36 On appeal, some
panel's findings were reversed. The Appellate Body reminded that prices
should be compared within a single market as appropriately defined. The
latter, according to the Appellate Body, requires consideration of both
demand-side (consumer-based) and supply-side (producer-based) factors to
check if renewable electricity and conventional electricity are sufficiently
substitutable to be deemed to be in the same market. In the present case, the
panel confined itself only to the demand side where consumers do not
differentiate between two types of electricity and concluded that the relevant
market is the blended electricity market. But the Appellate Body found that
supply-side factors, which are "important differences in cost structures and
operating costs and characteristics among generating technologies,"37
suggested that price comparisons should have been conducted within
competitive markets of renewable electricity only. It is government's choice
of the energy supply-mix including wind and solar power-generated
electricity which, the Appellate Body said, enables creation of the market of
renewable electricity.38 But the Appellate Body emphasized that such
supply-mix policy "in and of itself' cannot be said to confer a benefit.39 In
other words, the government's role in creation of a distinct green electricity
market is not, per se, tantamount to a benefit, and hence a subsidy.
Eventually, neither the panel nor the Appellate could confirm that the FIT
programme at issue was indeed a WATO-contemplated "subsidy" subjected
to the SCM Agreement disciplines.

C.

ASSESSMENT

The litigation in Canada - Renewable Energy / Canada - Feed-In Tariff
Program is noteworthy in many aspects. First, both complaining parties have
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Appellate Body Reports, supra note 22, paras. 5.121, 5.128.
Panel Reports, supra note 4, para. 7.3 13(c).
Id. para. 7.318.
Id. para. 9.23.
Appellate Body Reports, supra note 22, para. 5.178.
Id. para. 5.175.
Id.
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emphasized that they did not question the objectives of the FIT programme
to combat climate change and reduce carbon emissions. As declared by
Japan, this case involved "trade and investment," rather than "trade and
environment," issues,40 with panellists emphasizing that they did not opine
about the legitimacy of Ontario's goal of promoting renewables.41 While all
participants in this dispute seem to have fully acknowledged the necessity of
adequate government responses to global warming, they were mainly
concerned about the local-content obligation of the Canadian FIT
programme. A basic but important lesson from this case is that governments
can minimize trade conflicts by not attaching "localization" elements to their
green electricity policy.
Second, it is the first time when the adjudicators construed the meaning of
the government procurement clause under Article III of the GATT.42 The
question of Article 111:8(a) applicability to public purchases of green
electricity may arise in the future, for instance, in relation to those support
mechanisms that, like some EU schemes considered below, do not extend to
green electricity produced outside of the supporting country and thus treat
domestic electricity more favourably. The provision in question would
provide an ideal protection especially for government-dominated electricity
systems, with purchasing, transmission and distribution functions allocated
to public organizations. Indeed, where one public entity obtains electricity
from generators and transmits it to other public entities for distribution to
end-users, one may argue that these public bodies are closely related as
government units and, as a result, there are no arm's-length transactions
between the purchaser and seller of electricity, and hence no "commercial
resale." Because "products purchased for governmental purposes" refer,
inter alia, to "what is provided by government to recipients in the discharge
of its public functions," it would arguably be right to say for our case with no
private distributors in the system that it is a public function to supply endusers with electricity.
Third, the Appellate Body's analysis of subsidy issues gives much food for
thought and far-reaching implications from two sides of the same coin. On
the one hand, some scholars43 doubt whether the supply-side factors, the
government choice of energy-mix and the bifurcation of public intervention
in a new versus existing market, really matter to the subsidy determination.
40. Panel Reports, supra note 4, para. 7.7.
41. Id. para. 7.153.
42. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III: 8(a), OCT. 30, 1947, 61 STAT. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
43. See, e.g., Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis, A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue
IndustrialPolicy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the W4/TO,
17 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 11 (2014); Rajib Pal, Has the Appellate Body's Decision in Canada - Renewable
Energy / Canada - Feed-in Tariff Program Opened the Doorfor Production Subsidies?, 17 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 125 (2014); Luca Rubini, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. Lessons on Methodology in
Legal.Analysisfrom the Recent TO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies, 48 J. WORLD TRADE
895 (2014); Rolf H. Weber & Rika Koch, International Trade Law Challenges by Subsidies for
Renewable Energy, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 757 (2015).
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They warn that the benefit analysis in this case could somehow weaken the
WTO's stance towards trade-distorting public support in different industrial
sectors and suggest that such "judicial acrobatics" should be replaced with
the redrafting of the SCM Agreement to accommodate green subsidies in a
more appropriate way. 44 But on the other hand, the appellate findings

deserve praise from the environmental point of view.45 At the time when
WTO members as law-makers have so far remained idle over softening the
existing subsidy regime where needed, the Appellate Body tried, through its
interpretative authority, to carve out some policy space for promotion of
clean energy. Indeed, the narrowed definition of the relevant market and
the exclusion of the government's market-creating role from the definition
of "subsidy" broaden the scope of environmental actions exempt from the
SCM Agreement. Although it remains to be seen how this ruling will be
followed in the future, many countries may perceive the appellate
interpretations as an important signal of encouragement in implementation
of their renewable energy agenda.
IV.

EU Dispute Settlement Cases

Stimulus policies for renewable electricity have also been questioned
under EU law. We could find four cases where economic operators disputed
green schemes before national courts which, in turn, asked the Court of
Justice for the interpretation of certain EU provisions at issue. This section
examines those cases under EU rules on state aid and intra-regional import
restrictions.
A.

STATE AID

Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) imposes a general ban on aid granted by a member state or through
state resources - "state aid" - that distorts competition and trade within the
EU area by favouring certain enterprises - "undertakings" - or the
production of certain goods.
1.

PreussenElectra

In PreussenElectra, at issue was a German law that required regional
electricity distribution undertakings to purchase electricity generated in
their supply area from renewable energy sources at fixed minimum prices
higher than its real economic value. It also obliged upstream suppliers of
conventional electricity partially to compensate the distribution
undertakings for additional costs arising from such a purchase obligation.
PreussenElectra, an upstream electricity supplier, brought a complaint to a
44. Id.
45. See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, First WTO JudicialReview of Climate Change Subsidy Issues, 107
Am. J. INT'L L. 864 (2013); Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, Renewable Energy and Government Support:
Time to _gGreenh the SCM Agreement?, 14 WORLD TRADE REv. 479 (2015).
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court of Germany seeking recovery of the compensatory payment to
Schleswag, a regional electricity distributor, on the grounds that the law in
question was incompatible with European Community rules.46 In the
judgment of 2001, the Court of Justice recognized an "undeniable
advantage" for producers of renewable electricity,47 but eventually concluded
that the FIT programme at issue did not constitute state aid. This finding
was based mainly on the facts (i) that both the distributor and supplier of
electricity were private entities, and (ii) that the mere legislative requirement
for the former to purchase green electricity at fixed prices and for the latter
to share the associated financial burden did not involve any direct or indirect
transfer of state resources to generators.48 The ruling stipulated that this
conclusion was not undermined by the fact that the undertakings concerned
made fewer profits due to their purchase obligation and that they had fewer
taxes to pay as a result. This is so because "a diminution in tax receipt for
the state" was an "inherent feature" of the German legislation and could not
qualify as state aid through a tax waiver.49
2.

Vent De Colre

The Vent De Cokre case examined the French scheme under which
additional costs arising from distributers' purchases of wind-generated
electricity at an above-market price have been offset by charges paid by final
consumers of electricity in France. Pursuant to the Court of Justice's
previous interpretation, a measure constitutes "state aid" if four cumulative
conditions are met: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through
state resources; (ii) that intervention must be liable to affect trade between
member states; (iii) it must confer an advantage on the recipient; and (iv) it
must distort or threaten to distort competition.50 Considering that the
measure at issue satisfied the last three conditions, the local authorities asked
the Court of Justice whether it met the first condition as well. In the 2013
ruling, the Court of Justice basically addressed two questions as to whether
the measure was attributable to the state, and whether arising advantages
were granted directly or indirectly through state resources. With respect to
the first question, the Court of Justice confirmed that this scheme was
attributable to the French state, because the financial mechanism was
established by legislation and hence through the involvement of the public
agencies.5' As for the second question, the Court of Justice recalled its
previous interpretation that the concept of "intervention through state
46. For the background of this dispute, see Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-379/98,
PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG (2001) E.C.R. 1-2099, paras. 1-62.
47. Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG (2001) E.C.R. 1-2099, paras. 54, 61.
48. Id. paras. 59-61.
49. Id. para. 62; Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-379/98, supra note 46, paras. 161-62.
50. Case C-262/12, Association Vent De Colere! Federation nationale and Others v Ministre
de lfEcologie, du Developpement durable, des Transports et du Logement and Ministre de
1_ftconomie, des Finances et de 1_f1ndustrie, 2013, not yet published, para. 15.
51. Id. paras. 17-18.
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resources" - the first component of "state aid" above - covers not only
advantages granted directly by the state, but also those granted through a
public or private body appointed or established by the state to administer the
aid.52 In the context of the present case, the Court of Justice noted that a
public body indeed administered - and thus kept public control over - the
funds collected from all final consumers with a view to transferring them to
the electricity distributers concerned, and that domestic regulations
determined the amount of charges imposed on consumers.53 On this basis, it
concluded that the offset mechanism constituted an intervention through
state resources.54
B.

IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

As part of the principle of free movement of goods, Article 34 of the
TFEU prohibits the use between member states of "[q]uantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect."55
According to the caselaw, this prohibition applies to any measure that "is
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intraCommunity trade."56

1.

PreussenElectra

It was stipulated in PreussenElectrathat electricity, as a "good," is covered
by the import-restriction-forbidding rule.57 The Court of Justice noted that
the German law, which explicitly required purchase of the green electricity
within the distributors' area of supply, was able to prevent the use of that
type of electricity from non-German sources," such as renewable electricity
produced in Sweden at a lower cost. 59 But it concluded that the legislation in
question was not inconsistent with the EU ban on import restrictions given
the contribution of the contested measure to the implementation of the EU
policy for protection of the environment and the health and life of humans,
animals and plants. The Court of Justice also noted the view of the
European Commission that operation by each member state of a system of
certifying the origins of renewable electricity would be essential in order to
make trade in renewable electricity possible in practice.60
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. para. 20.
Id. paras. 19-33.
Id. para. 37.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 34, March, 30, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47.
Case C-379/98, supra note 47, para. 69.
Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-379/98, supra note 46, para. 197.
Case C-379/98, supra note 47, para. 71.
Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-379/98, supra note 46, para. 200.
See Case C-379/98, supra note 47, paras. 72-81.
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Alands

The Alands case dealt with a Swedish green energy system, which awards
producers of renewable electricity green certificates, special instruments that
can be sold to local suppliers and users who have a quota obligation for the
purchase of renewable electricity. Finnish company Alands Vindcraft
operated a wind farm in Finland connected to the closest Swedish grid. It
applied for green certificates in Sweden, but the application was turned
down on the grounds that only electricity generating facilities within
Sweden were eligible for obtaining green certificates.61 Notwithstanding its
finding of the import-impeding effect on foreign green power in the sense of
TFEU Article 34, the Court of Justice held in 2014 that the territorial
restriction in question was nevertheless justified.62Xhile agreeing with the
view that the climate mitigation objective could, in principle, be achieved
through the use of renewable electricity irrespective of its origin, the Court
of Justice concluded that the territorial limitation did not go beyond what
was necessary to attain that objective for several reasons. 63 First of all, EU
law, as it stands, has not yet harmonized the national support schemes for
green electricity across the region.64 In other words, public incentives in this
field do not need to benefit outsiders where the green energy market itself
remains fragmented within the EU. Moreover, national stimulus
programmes tend to target green electricity at its production (rather than
consumption) stage, because the green nature of electricity can be easily
tracked when electricity is produced. Thus, the environmental objectives of
reducing carbon emissions can be pursued primarily at the production
stage. 65 Interestingly, in an unusual departure from its typical practice, the
Court of Justice did not follow the Advocate General's opinion in this and
the Essent cases. The Advocate General took the view that the territorial
restrictions of the support at issue in fact violated the EU principle of the
free movement of goods and that the EU rules permitting such restrictions
should be invalidated.66 His main idea was that the limited access to national
support schemes would contradict one of the principal goals of EU's
renewable energy policy to "promote cross-border exchanges of green
electricity. "67
61. Advocate General Bot in Case C-573/12, Alands vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten,
2014, not yet published, paras. 24-26.
62. See Case C-573/12, Alands vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, 2014, not yet published,
para. 93; Advocate General Bot in Case C-573/12, supra note 61, para. 93.
63. Case C-573/12, supra note 62, paras. 93, 104.
64. Id. paras. 49-54, 94.
65. Id. paras. 94-96.
66. See Advocate General Bot in Case C-573/12, supra note 61, paras. 79-121; Advocate
General Bot in Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse
Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits - en Gasmarkt, 2014, not yet published, paras. 70116.
67. Advocate General Bot in Case C-573/12, supra note 61, para. 87.
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Essent

The Flemish Region of Belgium has operated a support scheme similar to
the Swedish one above. Electricity suppliers there have to surrender each
year a specified number of green certificates for renewable electricity of local
origin or otherwise pay a fine. In order to fulfil its quota obligation, Belgian
supplier Essent surrendered both green certificates for domestically
produced electricity and guarantees of origin obtained in Denmark, Sweden,
the Netherlands and Norway. But those guarantees were not accepted for
issuance of green certificates.68 Pursuant to the EU renewable energy
directive, guarantees of origin are special instruments - mutually
recognizable among EU members - that prove the green nature of
electricity and facilitate trade in renewable electricity.69 In 2014, the Court
of Justice observed that guarantees of origin, unlike green certificates, did
not entitle their holders to national support mechanisms.70 In line with the
Alands findings, the Court of Justice found that the current EU rules did not
require extension of those mechanisms to foreign green electricity, and
ultimately confirmed the compatibility of the Flemish scheme with the EU
principle of the free movement of goods on the basis of environmental and
climate-mitigation considerations.71 The Court of Justice stressed, however,
that the territorial restriction is justified as long as the suppliers concerned
can obtain green certificates under fair terms in a genuine market for
certificates and no excessive penalties apply to traders who have not fulfilled
their quota obligation.72 On the question of whether the Flemish measure
restricted the free movement of guarantees of origin as goods, the Court
simply noted that even on the assumption that the guarantees were goods,
the restriction of their movement could similarly be justified.73

C.

ASSESSMENT

As renewable energy programmes are susceptible to state aid (or subsidy)
challenges, governments are tempted to design sophisticated schemes that,
for instance, make private entities pay for green electricity without actual
public funds involved. But even this cannot fully prevent legal attacks as is
evident from two state aid cases considered above.
The judgement in PreussenElectra implied that state aid comprises
resources provided out of the public budget, with the corresponding EU
rules not applying, as a result, to statutory requirements causing private
68. For the factual background, see Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, Essent Belgium NVv
Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits - en Gasmarkt, 2014, not yet published,
paras. 1-42.
69. Id. para. 79.
70. Id.
71. Id. paras. 88-116.
72. Id. para. 116.
73. Id. para. 73-81.
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money to flow into pockets of green electricity producers.74 Similarly, such
requirements would hardly qualify as a "financial contribution" under the
VTO regime. Yet, they may still fall under the category of "any form of...
price support," the alternative group of public actions caught by the VTO
definition of "subsidy." Indeed, the government-created mechanism of
compulsory private purchases at fixed premium rates - analogous to the
German scheme in PreussenElectra - represents what the VTO panel in
China - GOES characterized as "direct government intervention in the
market with the design to fix the price of a good at a particular level."75 This
mechanism differs from measures causing "a random change in price" as an
incidental side effect that, according to that panel, is excluded from the
"price support" category.7 6 It follows that unlike the EU regime, the WATO
subsidy rules would capture the PreussenElectra-likeschemes if the "benefit"
element is confirmed to exist.
The Vent De Colere judgement indicates that where private resources are
transferred to electricity producers through a public organization, this may
well give grounds for a positive determination of state aid. In PreussenElectra,
unlike Vent De Colere, no system of fund management existed and private
operators were bound by the purchasing obligation by means of their own
financial resources that were not under government control.77 These factual
differences led to contrasting conclusions in two cases dealing with nonpublic resources. One can draw a parallel with VVTO subsidy law, which
also applies to indirect subsidies granted through funding mechanisms or
private bodies "entrusted" or "directed" by government.78
Despite the ability of green electricity imports to replace fuel-based
electricity and thus contribute to the cutting of carbon emissions in the
importing country, the Court of Justice made it clear in Alands and Essent
that this fact alone does not invalidate a territorial limitation of the
importing country's green electricity support. Some commentators suggest
that this finding may have certain influence on on-going renewable energy
reforms in many EU countries putting an end to the demands from the
European Commission to make domestic promotion available to foreign
generators. 79 But the judgments in those cases were simply based on the
current EU renewable energy law that does not require abolishment of the
territorial limitations in question. Thus, the formation of a single European
market of renewable electricity in the future will likely render the "localized"
74. Christian Koenig & Jiirgen Kiihling, EC Control of Aid Granted through State Resources,
AID L. Q. (2002), at 9, http://estal.lexxion.eu/article/ESTAL/2002/1/6.
75. Panel Report, China - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented FlatRolled Electrical Steel from the United States, paras. 7.85-86, WT/DS414/R (June 15, 2012)
(adopted Nov. 16, 2012).
76. Id.
77. Case C-262/12, supra note 50, paras. 34-36.
78. See Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.
79. See Joe Kirwin, EU High Court: Single Market Rules Don't Apply to Renewable Energy Feed-In
Tariffs, BLOOMBERG BNA: INTERNATIONAL TRADE DAILY (July 3, 2014).
EUR. ST.
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support schemes unjustifiable. The fact that, according to the Alands
decision, Norway and Sweden have managed to merge their green certificate
support schemes suggests that regional integration of this kind is an
achievable goal.o Although the Advocate General's conclusion about the
free-movement-of-goods breaches was disregarded in both cases, we believe
that he was, nevertheless, right in emphasizing the importance of crossborder exchanges of renewable electricity:
It is important to point out in this connection that one of the four
elements of the European Union's environmental policy, set out in
Article 191(1) TFEU, is "prudent and rational utilisation of natural
resources." The development of cross-border trade in green electricity
which would result from making national support schemes accessible to
foreign electricity producers would contribute to the attainment of that
objective by facilitating the optimal distribution of production between
the Member States according to their respective potentials.s1
With the global trend of growing support and production of green
electricity,82 the factual situations of EU cases may well be subjected to
VTO's legal scrutiny as well. For instance, if WTO member A's renewable
energy programmes do not apply to related green imports from member B,
the latter could, in principle, challenge A's incentives as an import restriction
being contrary to Article XI of the GATT and/or a discriminatory measure
within the meaning of Article III of the GATT on national treatment.
Articles XI and III apply to import restrictions at the border and within the
border respectively. Article XI bans any "prohibition or restrictions other
than duties, taxes or other charges . . . on the importation of any product of
the territory of any other [Member]." The scope of border restrictions here
comprises virtually any government measure (other than monetary
charges)-not confined to ordinary quotas or licences-that have a restrictive
effect on the value or volume of imports.83 Thus, similar to the
complainants in the EU cases above, B could argue that the restriction of the
access to incentives is tantamount to a de facto limitation of imports of
renewable electricity as domestic suppliers would prefer governmentsupported domestic electricity. EU jurisprudence has construed the EU
clause outlawing quantitative import restrictions-which is comparable to
Article XI-to embrace national support measures and, even, government
encouragement of local-content purchases.84 The EU rule, interpreted in
that way, seems to blur the distinction between a border and internal
80. Case C-573/12, supra note 62, paras. 22, 101.
81. Advocate General Bot in Case C-573/12, supra note 61, para. 109 (emphasis original,
footnote omitted).
82. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 2, at 199-229.
83. See Panel Report, Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictionson Ports of Entry, paras. 7.227.275, WT/DS366/R (Apr. 27, 2009) (adopted May 20, 2009).
84. Case C-379/98, supra note 47, paras. 69-70; Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-379/98,
supra note 46, para. 201.
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measures. Whereas this is not surprising for the EU, having a common
market of goods without customs borders inside, the WTO draws a strict
demarcation line between border and internal restrictions. Thus, Articles XI
and III cannot apply to the same measure simultaneously, 5 unless they deal
with different elements of the given measure. 86 The threshold WTO
criterion, in distinguishing internal measures from border ones, is whether
the factor triggering those measures takes place inside the border.87 As the
trigger factor for public favours in our case is the internalproduction and use
of green electricity, Article III should be considered as more relevant than
Article XI. But, even if incentives are challenged under Article III for being
discriminatory against foreign green electricity, they may be defended in the
WTO on different grounds, as follows.

First, if the government or a public utility is the purchaser of renewable
electricity, a national treatment exception for government procurement
under GATT Article 111:8(a) could be invoked, with all interpretative
parameters defined in Canada - Renewable Energy / Canada - Feed-In Tariff
Program to be satisfied. Section III.C of this article above considers when
this exception would apply.
Second, if the green incentive is considered to be a subsidy, an exception
under GATT Article 111:8(b) could apply. That provision exempts from the
national treatment principle: (i) "the payment of subsidies exclusively to
domestic producers" to the exclusion of foreign producers; and (ii) "subsidies
effected through government purchases of domestic products."88 The
second category would be of help if green electricity subsidies materialize
through government procurement. The first category is, however, limited
to only direct subsidies to producers involving the expenditure of revenue by
the government. 89 Conversely, subsidies to consumers or tax reductions
aimed at encouraging the use of green electricity would not benefit from this
exception.90
Third, Article XX of the GATT foresees general exceptions to GATT
obligations where an otherwise illegal measure is taken for, inter alia, the
85. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas

J.

Schoenbaum & Petros C. Mavroidis, THE WORLD
ed. 2006), at 270-71.
86. See Panel Report, India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, paras. 7.224, 7.296, WT/
DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001) (adopted Apr. 5, 2002); Appellate Body Report,
Argentina - Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, paras. 5.148-.149, WT/DS438/AB/R,
WT/DS444/AB/R, WT/DS445/AB/R (Jan. 15, 2015) (adoptedJan. 26, 2015).
87. See Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, para.
163, WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008) (adopted Jan.
12, 2009); Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, Customs Duty or Internal Charge? Revisiting the Delineation
Issue within Treaty Interpretation in the China - Auto Parts Case, 7 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 195 (2012), at 198-202.
88. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 42, art. III: 8(b).
89. Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, at 33-34, WT/
DS31/AB/R (June 23, 1997) (adoptedJuly 30, 1997).
90. See Riidiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Holger P. Hestermeyer (eds.), WTO
TRADE IN GOODs (2011), at 159.
-
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protection of human, animal or plant life or health; or the conservation of
exhaustible national resources. 91 Pursuant to a two-tear test developed in
WTO caselaw, the exception is operational only if the invoking party proves
that its measure is relevant to any of the identified public purposes and that
it is not applied in a manner which constitutes "a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination," or "a disguised restriction on international
trade. "92
One should bear in mind, however, that the GATT exceptions apply
within the context of the GATT and do not extend to other WTO treaties,
absent some textual indication to the contrary. 93 For instance, Article IIIexempt government purchases of electricity can still be caught by the SCM
Agreement, which requires a separate legal analysis independent of whether
this measure is justifiable under the GATT. Another caveat is that the
applicability of the aforementioned flexibilities is decided on a case-by-case
basis.
Future developments in the EU renewables sector may also cause third
countries to take issue with the EU (or its member states). Suppose this
regional bloc will eventually achieve full integration of electricity markets,
with national support being available to both domestic and imported green
electricity. Should, however, the incentives be limited to the EU territory,
non-EU countries, especially close neighbours, whose electricity would be
"disadvantaged" could claim the violation of the WTO's most-favourednation (MFN) principle. In that case, GATT Article XXIV for regional
trade agreements may come into the play. The EU could argue that the
EU-wide extension of domestic support systems deepens free trade in
compliance with the internal requirement of Article XXIV that demands
substantial liberalization of intra-regional trade. But the opponents would
argue that such an extension would be contrary to the external requirement
of Article XXIV not to increase the existing barriers to trade with third
countries, as EU suppliers would prefer subsidized EU-originating green
electricity opposed to imports from non-EU countries. This imaginary, yet
foreseeable, example suggests that in their efforts to harmonize their
electricity systems EU policy-makers will also need to take into account the
interests of outside countries. Ideally, making both EU and non-EU
electricity operators eligible for EU members' domestic incentives would be
most desirable from the VTO-regime's perspective.
Finally, national renewable-energy programmes have created new types of
commercial items, such as green certificates and guarantees of origin, that
can be used in international transactions. As the EU judicial practice
suggests, creating barriers to cross-border exchanges thereof is a sound
reason for trade tensions in the EU and beyond. But, the legal nature of
91. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 42, art. XX.
92. Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, at 22, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (adoptedMay 20, 1996).
93. See Shadikhodjaev, Renewable Energy and Government Support: Time to "Green" the SCM
Agreement?, supra note 45, at 503.
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these items, such as whether they are goods or not, remains unclear. When
it comes to the WTO, there is no across-the-board definition of "goods."
But because green certificates or guarantees of origin can be sold to the
market separately from electricity,94 WTO provisions on goods should apply
to them in principle. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Appellate Body
construed the term "goods," used in the SCM Agreement, as comprising
even items that are not both tradable as such and subject to tariff
classification.95
V.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases

Where a country infringes its obligations under an international investment
agreement, the affected investors may bring a complaint against the host
government through investor-state dispute settlement procedures.96 This
section discusses investment disputes related to renewable electricity support
schemes. As all of them are still pending cases, we have mainly relied on
disputing parties' submissions, as well as other publically available sources to
describe factual backgrounds and main legal issues.
A.

MESA POWER V. CANADA

In July 2011, US-based Mesa Power Group, LLC notified the
Government of Canada of its intent to initiate international arbitration
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) over certain
aspects of Ontario's FIT programme including its local content
requirement.97 Wind energy projects in Ontario normally go through a
strict evaluation process resulting in priority ranking scores that the Ontario
Power Authority uses to grant FIT contracts to successful applicants.98 All
four wind-power generation projects proposed by the claimant received low
scores. 99 Being concerned about the accuracy of the ranking methodology,
Mesa Power asked for clarification but was not provided with any
substantive explanation from the Canadian Government.100 Meanwhile, the
Ontario Power Authority unexpectedly issued a new set of rules for awarding
FIT contracts that, according to Mesa Power, disfavoured its proposed
94. At the Essent hearing, it was acknowledged that "a guarantee of origin may, like a green
certificate, be sold separately from electricity." See Advocate General Bot in Joined Cases C204/12 to C-208/12, supra note 66, para. 112.
95. Appellate Body Report, United States - FinalCountervailing Duty Determinationwith Respect
to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, para. 67, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004) (adopted
Feb. 17, 2004).
96. See Factsheet on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 3, 2013),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151791.pdf.
97. This case deals with the same Ontario FIT program as the WVTO case in section III of this
article; Mesa Power Group LLC v. Government of Canada, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011) Case No.
2012-17, Notice of Intent (July 6, 2011), paras. 1-21.
98. Mesa Power Group LLC v. Government of Canada, supra note 97.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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projects as those rules allowed rival wind projects to move from other parts
of Ontario to the region in which the claimant was interested.101

In this dispute, Mesa Power claims that the arbitrary and non-transparent
contract-awarding process violated NAITA Article 1105 (minimum
standard of treatment), and that the "buy local" element contravened Article
1106 that prohibits certain investment-related performance requirements.102
In addition, it alleges that Canada treated Canadian and Korean companies
more favourably in breach of Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1103
(MFN) respectively, and that Canada did not comply with Article 1503(2) by
failing to ensure that the Ontario Power Authority as a "state enterprise"
acted properly in carrying out Canada's NAFTA obligations.103 It claims
CDN $775 million in damages.104
In response, Canada has raised objections on both procedural and
substantive issues. First, it argues that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction because,
inter alia, the claimant filed its notice of arbitration before a NAFTArequired six-month waiting period had elapsed.105 Second, the challenged
measures constitute, it says, public procurement that NAFTA Article 1108
exempts from the obligations under Articles 1102, 1103 and 1106.106
Moreover, Canada disagrees with the alleged discrimination against the
investor, because no single instance of favourable treatment of Canadian
companies was identified in support of the Article 1102 claim, and because
the Korean consortium, which was given certain preferences under a
renewable energy scheme different from the FIT programme, and the
claimant were not in "like circumstances."107 Canada also dismissed the
Article 1105 claim on the grounds that FIT applications were, in fact, fairly
and reasonably assessed and that the provision does not prevent the
government from resorting to regulatory adjustments where needed.10s

B.

WINDSTREAM V. CANADA

In October 2012, Windstream Energy LLC, owned by a New York-based
investment group, initiated an investor-state dispute under the NAFTA
against Canada over the government of Ontario's moratorium on a FIT
project for offshore wind development.109 The Ontario Power Authority
granted Windstream a FIT contract with respect to 100-turbine offshore
101. Id.
102. Id. paras. 22-28.
103. Id.
104. Id. para. 37.
105. Mesa Power Group LLC v. Government of Canada, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014) Case No.
2012-17, Respondent Counter-Memorial and Reply on Jurisdiction (Feb. 28, 2014), paras. 23461.
106. Id. paras. 307-44.
107. Id. paras. 345-80.
108. Id. paras. 381-449.
109. Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) Notice of
Intent (Oct. 17, 2012), para. 15.
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generation facility in Lake of Ontario, the source of drinking water for the
local population.11o This was the largest single FIT contract awarded for
wind-power generation."' Windstream expected that higher and steadier
wind speeds in the offshore zone would produce a higher energy-generating
capacity than any FIT project in the onshore area.11 2 A full implementation
of the project, however, required approvals from different competent bodies.
Being informed by the Canadian side of some possible regulatory risks,
Windstream nevertheless executed the contract, made some pre-payments,
bore certain costs and entered into binding arrangements for purchasing
turbine supply.113 But lacking scientific certainty about possible effects on
human health, safety and environment, the government of Ontario decided
to delay all existing approval procedures and froze the project until more
clarity would be made through yet-to-be established comprehensive
assessment procedures.114 But, Windstream alleges that the moratorium was
politically motivated and imposed due to the higher cost of energy
production from offshore facilities compared to onshore wind
development.''5

Windstream claims that Canada unlawfully expropriated Windstream's
investments contrary to NAITA Article 1110, because the moratorium has
deprived it of control of its investments and related benefits, with no marketvalue compensation paid.116 Windstream argues that Canada violated its
right to fair and equitable treatment under Article 1105 through "arbitrary,
irrational and discriminatory" measures diminishing "legitimate
expectations" of the investor."1
Finally, the claimant argues that the
moratorium as applied solely to this and not other FIT projects of domestic
and foreign investors constitutes discrimination against Windstream within
the meaning of Articles 1102 and 1103.11 For these reasons, Windstream
claims damages of at least CDN $475,230,000.119
But the Canadian government refutes the Article 1105 claim saying that
the claimant invested in a "highly speculative venture" with full knowledge
of the associated risks before the FIT contract was signed.120 As for the
Articles 1102 and 1103 allegations, it argues that the moratorium applies to
all offshore wind power projects without exception, and that the claimant's
examples of more favourable treatment apply, in fact, to completely different
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. para. 17.
113. Id. para. 30.
114. Id. paras. 25-26.
115. Id.
116. Id. paras. 32-44.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) Respondent
Response to Notice of Arbitration (Apr. 26, 2013), para. 53.
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types of projects in different circumstances.121 Finally, Canada dismisses the
expropriation claim under Article 1110 as the moratorium is not intended to
be permanent and does not deprive the claimant of its investment.122

C.

EUROPEAN CASES

A number of investor-state disputes have recently attacked certain changes
in green electricity promotion schemes in some European countries. Spain,
Italy, and the Czech Republic are among the countries that have reportedly
faced arbitral challenges. To date, at least seventeen arbitrations are
pending.123 At issue in these proceedings are various governmental measures
that have retroactively reduced initially-fixed FIT rates or duration of green
incentives, imposed extra taxes on FIT operators, introduced limits on
production hours for electricity eligible for FIT prices, or otherwise
modified statutory or contractual terms to the detriment of investors.124 The
national authorities have made those adjustments, typically for austerity
reasons, amid the financial crisis in Europe or because of a fall in market
prices of renewable energy. Although arbitration documents have not been
publicized yet, the affected investors could presumably allege violations of
provisions on (indirect) expropriation and fair and equitable treatment either
under the plurilateral Energy Charter Treaty that provides investment
protection in the (electrical) energy sector or under a respective bilateral
investment agreement.1 25

D.

ASSESSMENT

In general, the claimants in the cases above have challenged the host
country's measure under investment treaty standards of non-discrimination,
fair and equitable treatment and expropriation. With still no rulings, our
assessment here is largely speculative. Given a wide variety of investment
treaties, the investor-state jurisprudence is less consistent, and hence less
predictable, than VVTO or EU caselaw. Nevertheless, the judicial practice
in this field has generally required quite a high threshold for establishing
violations, except where government actions are excessively arbitrary, unfair
and discriminatory against foreign investors or their investment.
121. Id. paras. 44-48.
122. Id. paras. 57-60.
123. Ratchel W. Thorn, Renewable Energy Poliy Changes Lead to Damages Claims - Investment
Treaties, EuropeanFeed-In Tariffs, Arbitration, PoliticalRisk, Expropriation(une 2014), available at
http://www.chadbourne.com/renewable-energy-policy-changes-june2014projectfinance.
124. See Jha Vyoma, Trends in Investor Claims over Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS July 19, 2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/
see also Rachel A.
trends-in-investor-claims-over-feed-in-tariffs-for-renewable-energy/;
Nathanson, The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment Economic-Support Systems as Indirect
ExpropriationPost-Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis, 98 IowA L. REv. 863 (2013), at 892-97.
125. Vyoma, supra note 124.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
WINTER 20161

PROMOTION OF "GREEN" ELECTRICITY

365

The claimants in Mesa Power v. Canada and Windstream v. Canada

challenge the Ontario FIT programme as being less favourable in terms of
both national treatment and MFN, while Canada argues the absence of a
right comparator--a domestic or foreign investor whose treatment could
appropriately be compared with that of the disputing investor. Thus, the
issue of whether the treatment occurs in "like circumstances" is crucial here
and needs to be addressed before proceeding with the allegations of
discrimination as such.126 For the purposes of such likeness analysis, one will
need to check the existence of a competitive relationship between the
investor concerned and a comparator, their association with a single
economic (business) sector or consider other relevant factors.127 In addition,
NAIPTA tribunals in three investment cases suggested that the rationale for
the contested measure and its policy objective should also be given due
attention.128 In other words, reasonable government policies may make the
foreign investor "unlike" to its comparators, provided that those policies:
"(1) do not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and
domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the
investment liberalizing objectives of [the investment treaty]."129
Accordingly, where the government revokes foreign-invested green
electricity projects for their environmentally-risky or health-hazard impacts,
the foreign investors concerned and comparators whose projects have not
been blocked may, in principle, be considered as not being "in like
circumstances" if the cause of the revocation is the legitimate policy to
protect the environment or public health, which satisfies those two
conditions.30 This argument could apply to Ontario's moratorium on
Windstream's offshore wind project.
As with the Canada - Renewable Energy / Canada - Feed-In TariffProgram

case, the claimant in Mesa Power v. Canada challenges the "buy local"
requirement, while Canada claims exception under the NAFTA for public
procurement.131 Given factual similarities, we expect that the tribunal will
consider the VTO findings on this particular issue but not mechanically
transpose them into the NAFTA context in light of different applicable legal
126. Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award (Nov. 21, 2007), para. 196.
127. For the review of the judicial practice on "like circumstances", see Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Nat? Treatment, (August Reinisch ed., STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION) (2008), at
38-48.
128. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of
Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001), paras. 76-78; GAMI Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 15, 2004), para. 114; Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Sept. 18, 2009), paras. 206-10 and 213.
129. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, supra note 128, para. 78.
130. GAMI Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 15,
2004), para. 114.
131. Mesa Power Group LLC v. Government of Canada, Respondent Counter-Memorial and
Reply on Jurisdiction, supra note 105, paras. 321-27.
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regimes.132 For instance, NAPTA Article 1108 simply states in paragraphs
7(a) and 8(b) that specified investment standards do not apply to
"procurement by a Party or a state enterprise" without replicating the
GATT Article 111:8(a) conditions that public procurement must meet in
order to escape the national treatment disciplines.
Although the outright seizure of property is not at issue in the Windstream
and European cases, they nevertheless deal with some "softer" forms of
government intervention that have prevented the investors from full
utilization of their investment. It is a controversial issue whether such
"regulatory takings" qualify as indirect expropriation. On the one hand, the
Metalclad v. Mexico award defined the term "expropriation" under the
NAFTA in an overly broad way, criticized in a number of subsequent
cases, 33 to include even "covert or incidental interference with the use of
property," which fully or partially deprives the owner of "the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state."134

Moreover, the

NAITA tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada admitted that temporary or partial
deprivation of the owner's ability to make use of its economic rights would
amount to expropriation "in some contexts and circumstances."135 On the
other hand, the tribunal in Methanex v. United States held:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due
process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment
is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then
putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the
government would refrain from such regulation.136
In order to draw a line between a non-compensable regulation and indirect
expropriation in green electricity cases, arbitrators may refer to several
criteria developed by recent caselaw, namely the extent of interference with
the property right, the character of governmental measures (purpose and
context), and the measure's interference with reasonable and investmentbacked expectations.137
132. See, e.g., id.; Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
05/2, Award (Sept. 18, 2009), para. 193.
133. See Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/02/01, Award (July 17, 2006), para. 177.
134. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award
(Aug. 30, 2000), para. 103.
135. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000),
para. 283.
136. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the
Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), Part IV - Chapter D - Page 4, para. 7.
137. See OECD, "Indirect Expropriation"and "the Right to Regulate" in InternationalInvestment
Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/04, OECD Publishing, at 920.
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The litigation over the ex post facto regime changes affecting renewable
electricity in Europe will probably raise a question as to whether the right to
benefit from a FIT or similar scheme is eligible for protection under the
relevant investment treaty. This right could be viewed either as (i) a
statutory or contractual right that investment treaties may include in the
definition of "investment," or as (ii) merely an individual right associated
with a larger or general investment which, taken as a whole, constitutes a
qualified "investment" pursuant to the theory of "totality of rights."13 The
verification of the fact of expropriation here will vary depending on which of
these views prevails. In the first case, it is relatively straightforward to prove
expropriation of the per se right of enjoyment if the adverse effect of the
regulatory changes on the investor is significant enough. But the second
case would likely result in a negative finding, as the support amendment
would not necessarily deprive the claimant of full ownership and control of
its general investment-be it enterprise, equity infusion, or property
involved in green power generation.139 It is this ownership or control factor
that played a key role in earlier arbitrations on expropriation claims.140 The
Energy Charter Treaty arbitral decision in the Nykomb v. Latvia case, having
a similar factual context, clearly shows this. Company Windau in Latvia,
which was acquired by Sweden's Nykomb, assumed a contractual obligation
vis-a-vis a local state electricity distributor to produce heat and electricity via
natural gas cogeneration in exchange of a preferential eight-year "double
tariff." But the Latvian law later scaled down, retroactively, the double tariff
for cogeneration projects, which Nykomb claimed to be indirect
expropriation. But the tribunal disagreed:
The Tribunal finds that 'regulatory takings' may under the
circumstances amount to expropriation or the equivalent of an
expropriation. The decisive factor for drawing the border-line towards
expropriation must primarily be the degree of possession taking or
control over the enterprise the disputed measures entail. In the present
case, there is no possession taking of Windau or its assets, no
interference with the shareholder's rights or with the management's
control over and running of the enterprise-apart from ordinary
regulatory provisions laid down in the production licence, the off-take
agreement, etc.141
The standard of fair and equitable treatment is also invocable for the case of
the ex post facto modifications.142 It intends to protect the legitimate
138. See Anatole Boute, Combating Climate Change through Investment Arbitration, 35 FORDHAM
L. J. 613 (2012), at 627-3 1.
139. See id.
140. Id at 632, 635.
141. Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. Republic of Latvia, SCC Case No 118/
2001, Award (Dec. 16, 2003), section 4.3.1, at 33.
142. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Law-Carbon Economy (2010), at
137.
INT'L
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expectations that investors have had on the basis of the legal regime created
by the host government with a view of inducing investment.143 Investors
embark on costly green projects in reliance on public incentives promised at
the time of investing, so that departure from that promise would arguably
confound their expectations.144 But this fact alone will not automatically
guarantee a victory for disputing investors. For instance, the tribunal in
Electrabel v. Hungary found that under the Energy Charter Treaty principle
of fair and equitable treatment "the investor is promised protection against
unfair changes," but "the host state is entitled to maintain a reasonable
degree of regulatory flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the
public interest."145 Similarly, the tribunal in Mobil v. Canada observed that
this standard in the NAITA context does not prevent regulatory changes
based on new policies and needs "even if some of those changes may have
far-reaching consequences and effects, and even if they impose significant
additional burdens on an investor."146 Therefore, the claimants will have to
bear quite a heavy burden of proof to succeed on this point.
Finally, restrictions on foreign-invested renewable electricity projects may
be eligible for additional flexibilities, other than public interest embedded by
adjudicators in existing standards by the way of interpretation, that give
some policy space for socially desirable government behaviour. First,
signatories to international investment agreements may adopt interpretative
statements that clarify or add some value to the existing rules with a view of
exempting public-purpose measures from certain obligations vis-a-vis
foreign investors and investment.147 Second, a number of recent treaties
contain general exceptions, usually modelled after the corresponding VTO
provisions (typically, GATT Article XX), that make a blanket exemption for
justifiable state wrongdoings.148 Third, the current tendency in investment
treaty-making is to explicitly recognize non-economic objectives in the text
itself, which would arguably discourage arbitral decisions based on exclusive
investment policy values.149 All three of these options intend to strike a
balance between a host state's obligation to protect foreign investors
(investment) and its sovereign right and duty to shelter the society and
environment from adverse impacts of business activities.i5o
143. See Roland Klager, "Fairand Equitable Treatment" in InternationalInvestment Law (2013), at
116-17.
144. See id.
145. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012), para. 7.77.
146. Mobil Investments Canada, Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and on Principles of Quantum (May 22,
2012), para. 153.
147. Suzanne A. Spears, The Questfor Policy Space in a New Generation oflInternationalInvestment
Agreements, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 1037 (2010), at 1048-59.
148. Id. at 1059-64.
149. Id. at 1064-71.
150. Id.
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Interplay between Trade and Investment Legal Regimes

Trade and investment legal regimes are mutually complementary in many
ways. They share the common goal of de-restricting "working" conditions
for economic operators in the respective field. For instance, local-content
measures are equally condemned by international trade and investment
disciplines for hampering imports and imposing undesirable performance
requirements on investors. Additionally, both regimes provide for nondiscrimination. Despite these commonalities, trade and investment rules
may also clash under certain circumstances. Let us consider two situations
with regard to renewable electricity schemes.
As a first example, suppose that international authorities find green
incentives to be illegal under a trade regime and the complying country
takes, as a result, retroactive actions of revocation or modification which
affect investors. Retrospective remedies are not typical of the GATTI/ TO
dispute settlement procedures, but a few real cases show that they are not, in
principle, ruled out under the multilateral trading system altogether.15 For
instance, in Australia - Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 - US), the WTO
panel found that the subsidy at issue had to be fully repaid in the light of the
SCM Agreement provision calling for withdrawal of prohibited subsidies.152
Under EU law, mandatory recovery of unlawful state aid, i.e. recipient's
repayment of public funds etc. together with interest where appropriate, is
even a common practice that intends to "re-establish the situation that
existed on the market prior to the granting of the aid."53 The European
Commission adopted around 110 state-aid recovery decisions in the period
between 2000 and 2007 alone.154 Such trade-law-consistent measures with
the retrospective legal effect may well give rise to investor-state disputes. In
Micula v. Romania, investors complained about the government's retroactive
repeal of certain long-term tax incentives.55 Romania abolished the tax
benefits to comply with the EU state aid obligations, but the tribunal found
this to be a breach of the investment treaty principle of fair and equitable
treatment.1 56
A second example of the trade-investment clash can be seen through the
investor-state disputes over green support changes in European countries, as
151. For this issue, see Sherzod Shadikhodjaev and Nohyoung Park, Cessation and Reparation in
the GATT/WTO Legal System: A View from the Law of State Responsibility, 41 J. WORLD TRADE
1237 (2007), at 1243-56.
152. Panel Report, Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters ofAutomotive Leather
-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSUby the United States, paras. 6.22, 6.39, 6.43-.49, WT/DS126/
RW (Jan. 21, 2000) (adopted Feb. 11, 2000).
153. Notice from the Commission - Towards an effective implementation of Commission
decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid, OJ C 272/4
(Nov. 15, 2007), para. 13.
154. Id. para. 2.
155. loan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award
(Dec. 11, 2013).
156. See id. para. 340.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
370

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 49, NO. 3

considered above. If the arbitrators eventually side with the investors and
award damages that must be paid by the defending European countries, the
compensation to the investors could be questioned under EU's state aid
disciplines.157 In Micula v. Romania, for instance, the European Commission
warned that compensation under the arbitral award would amount to illegal
state aid to be recovered from the recipients.158 But the investment
adjudicators noted that it would be "inappropriate for the Tribunal to base
its decisions in this case on matters of EU law" and opted not to address the
issue of enforceability of the ruling.159 Having lost that case, Romania
partially executed the award, but the European Commission ordered
Romania to suspend its implementation, which provoked a new dispute in
the EU judicial procedures between the investors and the European
Commission.160

Some

commentators

suggest

that

enforcement

of

investment awards within the EU legal system would constitute illegal state
aid if compensatory payment is ordered for government's repeal of economic
benefits which, themselves, qualify as unlawful state aid.161 Whether the
payment of damages authorized in non-WTO fora would be against WTO
subsidy rules has not yet been addressed in real cases. But at least in theory,
compensation of this kind could amount to public funds benefiting selected
recipients which would, in principle, fall within WTO's formal definition of
an enterprise-specific "subsidy."162
It follows that, in the interest of legal certainty in both of the given
situations, treaty-makers should (re-)formulate their agreements in a way
that would effectively compromise their trade and investment obligations.
For this purpose, they could make it explicit in investment treaties that the
dispute settlement procedures thereof do not apply to public support
withdrawals or amendments that are consistent with applicable international
trade rules. In trade agreements, they could insert text that would exclude
compensation ordered by international courts from the scope of disputable
("triable") measures under the respective trade regime. This approach
would prevent a conflict of rules by making two regimes mutually exclusive
157. See, e.g., Pietro Ortolani, Intra-EUArbitral Awards vis-4-vis Article 107 TFEU: State Aid
Law as a Limit to Compliance, 6 J. INT'L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 118 (2015), at 126-27.
158. Joan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania, supra note 155, paras. 334-36; see also
European Commission, State Aid SA.38517(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) - Romania Implementation
of Arbitral award Micula v. Romania of 11 December 2013, Bruxelles (Oct. 1, 2014), C(2014)
6848 final.
159. loan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania, supra note 155, para. 340.
160. Case T-646/14, Micula and Others v. Commission, pending case, OJ C 439/29 (Aug. 12,
2014).
161. Christian Tietje and Clemens Wackernagel, Outlawing Compliance? - The Enforcement of
Intra-EU Investment Awards and EU State Aid Law, Policy Papers on Transnational Economic
Law, No. 41 (2014), Transnational Economic Law Research Center, Faculty of Law of MartinLuther-University Halle Wittenberg, Germany, at 7.
162. Cf European Commission, State Aid SA.38517(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN), supra note 158,
paras. 27-50.
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in relation to subsidy/state aid issues in general and green electricity stimulus
programmes in particular.
The trade-investment clash in the first example above is a result of using
unlawful renewable energy schemes. Thus, if governments refrain from
giving troublesome subsidies, there will be no trade frictions and no interregime conflicts as a result. But the reality is that what seems lawful to the
granting authority may eventually be found illegal in international fora.
Thus, legislative reforms towards "greening" the existing trade disciplines
would put subsidizing governments on a much safer footing.163 Moreover,
harmonization (integration) of renewable electricity schemes among
economies involved in the supply chain would also lessen trade tensions. But
this would require, inter alia, a mechanism of verifying the "greenness" of
electricity and an operative interconnection of power grids between
neighbouring countries that would facilitate cross-border exchanges of
renewable electricity.
Last but not least, placing trade and investment regimes under a single
international framework would greatly strengthen their mutual
supportiveness within that framework. Therefore, it should become a
normal practice for all trade agreements to contain investment rules with the
ultimate effect of absorbing existing investment treaties between the parties
concerned.
VII.

Conclusion

The legal cases reviewed in the preceding sections have arisen due to
negative impacts of controversial clean energy programmes on trade and
investment. Stimulus measures may impede imports of green electricity and
associated materials. Non-transparent and arbitrary investment procedures
as well as worsening of early-announced support conditions may frustrate
foreign investors engaged in renewable electricity projects. While
adjudicators in trade disputes have generally tried to preserve some policy
space under respective rules, ongoing investor-state arbitral cases have yet to
reveal whether the investment treaty provisions at issue allow regulatory
flexibility in the renewables-related sector.
Government support for low-carbon activities generally play an
encouraging role in the market, but it cannot properly deal with some
constraints on green power development, such as intermittency of electricity
generation from weather-dependent renewables or scarcity of certain
renewable resources in particular regions. This necessitates the application
of additional instruments to diversify the energy supply-mix. Where
subsidization tools are not sufficient or efficient, governments should turn to
explore the ways of intensifying cross-border movement of renewable
electricity and related items by establishing the necessary infrastructure,
removing market access barriers and harmonizing country-specific legal
163. See Shadikhodjaev, Renewable Energy and Government Support: Time to "Green" the SCM
Agreement?, supra note 45, at 493-506.
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regimes.164 The VTO and EU cases suggest that this will also require
development of an effective means of distinguishing between renewable and
conventional electricity on both supply and demand sides. For countries
where it is cheaper to import renewable electricity than to produce (or
purchase) it domestically, electricity trade could either obviate the need for
cumbersome incentive schemes there or otherwise provide foreign
renewable electricity with greater access to their national support systems
and, thus, reduce the extent of international tensions over stimulus policies
in this field.

164. Bahar & Sauvage, supra note 5, at 7 (concluding that "electricity trade is expected to
become an increasingly important strategy to meet countries' [renewable energy] goals").
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